IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION

TODD DAMASE OUELLETTE

)
)
Petitioner,
)
v.
)
)
VIACOM INTERNATIONAL, INC.
)
)
Respondents.
)
_________________________________)

CV 10-133-M-DWM-JCL

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Viacom International’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings. Magistrate Judge Lynch recommends granting the motion and
dismissing Plaintiff Todd Damase Ouellette’s complaint with prejudice. The
Court agrees and adopts Judge Lynch’s Findings and Recommendation in full.
BACKGROUND
Ouellette, proceeding pro se, is suing Viacom for violations of 17 U.S.C. §
512(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Ouellette alleges that Viacom
misrepresented to Youtube.com that Ouellette’s uploaded videos infringed on its
copyrights and that those misrepresentations led Youtube.com to wrongfully
remove Ouellette’s videos and the termination of at least one of Ouellette’s
Youtube.com accounts. Viacom argues that, even taking Ouellette’s allegations as
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true, Ouellette has failed to plead a viable misrepresentation claim under § 512(f).
Viacom’s motion was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Lynch under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b). Judge Lynch agreed with Viacom and recommends that
judgment be granted in Viacom’s favor and that Ouellette’s amended complaint be
dismissed with prejudice.
Ouellette timely objected to Judge Lynch’s Findings and Recommendation.
Ouellette is, therefore, entitled to de novo review of the specified findings and
recommendations to which he objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The portions of the
Findings and Recommendation not specifically objected to are reviewed for clear
error. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Bus. Mach. Inc., 656 F.3d 1309,
1313 (9th Cir. 1981).
ANALYSIS
Judge Lynch concluded that Ouellette’s pleadings, taken as true, fail to state
a claim under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) in three ways. First, Ouellette failed to plead
sufficient facts to establish that Viacom knew that Ouellette’s videos were not
infringing on its copyrights—for instance, while Ouellette admitted that the videos
in question were portions of copyrighted Viacom programs, he failed to plead
facts demonstrating Viacom knew that it was not copyright infringement for
Ouellette to post those videos on Youtube.com. Second, Ouellette failed to plead
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facts supporting his assertion that Viacom admitted that his videos were “fair use”
of its copyrighted material. Third, Ouellette failed to plead facts supporting his
assertion that Viacom knew that its scanning software was improperly flagging
Ouellette’s protected, “fair use” videos as infringing on its copyrights. Based on
these inadequacies and Ouellette’s failure to meet the § 512(f) standard articulated
in a previous order, Judge Lynch recommends dismissing Ouellette’s complaint
with prejudice.
I.

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and its “takedown” provision
The rapid growth of internet use during the 1990s was a double-edged

sword for copyright law. For copyright owners, the internet was a means to
promote their work, but it was also a means of pirating their work on a massive
scale. See e.g. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir.
2001) (discussing program that allowed users to download vast amounts of
copyrighted musical compositions). For entities that provided consumer access to
the internet (service providers), the internet was not only a profitable frontier, but
it was a frontier fraught with unknown copyright liability. Applying traditional
copyright law, for instance, service providers could be liable for contributing to
copyright infringement by receiving compensation from users that used the
internet to infringe copyrighted works. Cf. S. Rep. 105–190, at 8 (1998) (Senate
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Committee on the Judiciary Report discussing that “service providers may
hesitate” to continue in “the ordinary course of their operations” without limiting
“potential copyright infringement liability”). The scope of copyright liability for
service providers was among the “[d]ifficult and controversial questions of
copyright liability in the online world” that led Congress to pass the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.
2004) (citing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998)).
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512, sets out the
responsibilities of copyright owners (e.g., Viacom), internet users (e.g., Ouellette),
and service providers1 (e.g., Youtube.com). The Act’s “takedown” scheme, 17
U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) and (c)(3), strikes a balance that protects the interests of
both copyright owners and service providers. Judge Lynch succinctly articulated
the “takedown” process:
If a copyright owner finds activity on the internet it believes constitutes
an infringement of its rights, the owner may serve a notice of the
claimed infringement on the hosting internet service provider, which, in
“Service provider” is broadly defined by DMCA as “an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the
user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or
received. 17 U.S.C. § (k)(1)(A).
1
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substance, requires the provider to take the material down from the
internet. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) and (c)(3).
(Doc. 60 at 5.) Essentially, the Act requires copyright owners, as opposed to
service providers, to police their copyrights on the internet. Perfect 10, Inc. v.
CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the Act places the
“burden of policing copyright infringement . . . squarely on the owners of the
copyright.”).
To protect internet users from over-protective copyright enforcement by
copyright owners, the Act requires a copyright owner’s “takedown” notice to
include a statement, made under the penalty of perjury, that it “has a good faith
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the
copyright owner, its agent, or the law.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v); see also
Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d at 1113.
In formulating a good-faith belief that another’s use of the copyrighted
material is not authorized by “law,” the copyright owner must consider the “fair
use doctrine” under 17 U.S.C. § 107. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 571 F. Supp.
2d 1150, 1154–1155 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2008) (reasoning that a copyright owner
acts in bad faith in issuing a takedown notice without “proper consideration of the
fair use doctrine”). The fair use doctrine recognizes that not every use of
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copyrighted materials is copyright infringement—for instance, using a short
segment of a copyrighted video for educational purposes. Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) (“Anyone . . . that makes
fair use of the work is not an infringer of the copyright with respect to such use.”).
Under section 512(f), a copyright owner may be liable for damages if it does
not make a good-faith assertion in its takedown notice that the subject material
infringes on its copyright. In the words of the statute, a copyright owner “who
knowingly materially represents . . . that the material or activity is infringing . . .
shall be liable for damages incurred by the alleged infringer[.]” 17 U.S.C. § 512(f);
see also Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (“A party is liable if it ‘knowingly’ and ‘materially’ misrepresents that
copyright infringement has occured.”).
II.

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s subjective good-faith
standard for misrepresentation claims
Ouellette objects to Judge Lynch’s conclusion that Ouellette has failed to

sufficiently allege that Viacom knew that its “scanning software” was
misidentifying Ouellette’s videos as infringing on its copyrights. Ouellette argues
that he has no way to prove at this stage of the proceedings that Viacom knew its
software was flagging non-infringing videos and nevertheless issued takedown
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notices. Judge Lynch’s finding did not require Ouellette to prove his claims,
however. It required Ouellette to allege sufficient facts that Viacom knew about
the scanning software’s issues when it issued its takedown notices.
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted § 512(f) as setting a high bar for
plaintiffs. Whether a copyright owner issued its takedown notice in “good faith” is
analyzed under a subjective standard. Rossi v. Motion Picture Assn. of Am., Inc.,
391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, defendants such as Viacom are liable
only if they know that the subject material is not infringing on its copyright when
they issue their takedown notices. Id. at 1004–1005 (“A copyright owner cannot be
liable simply because an unknowing mistake is made, even if the copyright owner
acted unreasonably in making the mistakes.”).
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. illustrates the strict requirements a plaintiff
must meet to plead a sufficient § 512(f) claim. There, the plaintiff alleged that the
copyright owner, Universal, knew that her video did not infringe on its copyright
but issued a takedown notice nonetheless. Lenz, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 1151.
Universal issued a takedown notice to Youtube.com to remove the plaintiff’s video
of her baby dancing to a song by the artist Prince. Id. at 1151–1152. The
plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Universal was familiar with copyright actions and
knew that her video was “fair use” of the song but issued a takedown notice “solely
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to satisfy Prince.” Id. at 1156. The plaintiff included information that Prince had
been outspoken about his desire to “reclaim his art on the internet.” Id. at 1152
(quotation marks omitted). On a motion to dismiss, the district court ruled that the
plaintiff’s claims were sufficient at the pleading stage because she had alleged facts
that demonstrated that Universal had issued its takedown notice to appease Prince,
instead of in good faith that her video had infringed its copyrights. Id. at 1156.2
The high standard for a § 512(f) claim reflects the reality that copyright
owners face an uphill battle to protect their copyrights on the internet. As of 2010,
for example, Youtube.com added one billion video clips a day “with more than 24
hours of new video uploaded to the site every minute.” Viacom Intern., Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., ___ F. 3d ___, 2012 WL 1130851, *3 (2d Cir. 2012). Without the
subjective standard, copyright owners such as Viacom could face limitless lawsuits
just by policing its copyrighted material on the internet.
Contrary to Ouellette’s assertion that interrogatories are the correct means
for him to discover Viacom’s intent in issuing its takedown notice to Youtube.com,

Notably, the district court also opined that it was unlikely that the plaintiff
would ultimately prevail in her case because of the high bar required under the
subjective-belief standard. “Although the Court has considerable doubt that Lenz
will be able to prove that Universal acted with subjective bad faith required by
Rossi, and following discovery her claims well may be appropriate for summary
judgement, Lenz’s allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage.” Id.
2
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§ 512(f) requires Ouellette to allege facts, at the pleading stage, that demonstrate
that Viacom acted without a good-faith belief. The Court agrees with Judge Lynch
that Ouellette’s complaint fails to plead factual allegations that meet the subjective
standard. Ouellette presents no facts demonstrating that Viacom actually knew that
his videos were fair use but nevertheless issued the takedown notice. In fact,
Ouellette fails to plead any facts establishing that his videos were fair use of
Viacom’s copyrighted materials. Thus, Ouellette has failed to plead a prima facie
case of misrepresentation under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), Rossi, and Lenz.
III.

Viacom’s use of “scanning software”
Ouellette next objects to Judge Lynch’s finding that Ouellette failed to

sufficiently allege that Viacom’s use of “scanning software” violates the DMCA’s
good-faith requirement. The essence of Oullette’s objection is that Viacom’s
history establishes that it uses its software to abuse the takedown process, a form of
“internet bullying.”
The problem with Ouellette’s objection, though, is that he cannot satisfy his
burden under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act by alleging that Viacom has
acted improperly in the past to others. Put another way, Rossi requires Ouellette to
plead factual allegations that Viacom acted improperly in his case. Ouellette was
required to plead facts that Viacom knew that its “scanning software” was flagging
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his non-infringing videos and that Viacom issued a takedown notice nonetheless.
Because the Court agrees with Judge Lynch that Ouellette has failed to allege facts
to meet this required element, Ouellette has failed to state a sufficient § 512(f)
claim.
IV.

Viacom’s “admission” that Ouellette’s videos were fair use
Ouellette also objects to Judge Lynch’s finding that Ouellette did not

sufficiently allege that Viacom “admitted” that Ouellette’s videos were fair use of
its copyrighted works. Ouellette argues that, while Viacom has not actually
admitted that his videos are fair use, Viacom’s actions are consistent with admitting
that they are fair use—namely, (1) Viacom has not sued Ouellette for copyright
infringement even though it has issued 35 takedown notices against him and (2)
YouTube.com has allegedly re-posted some of Ouellette’s videos without
complaint from Viacom.
But these actions are not equivalent to an admission by Viacom that
Ouellette’s videos are fair use.3 And as Judge Lynch correctly noted, the United
There are, perhaps, many legitimate reasons why Viacom might have
decided not to sue Ouellette and has not complained about the videos that
Youtube.com has allegedly re-posted. As noted above, there are one billion
videos added to Youtube.com every day. Viacom may have decided that it is
simply not in the company’s financial interest to sue each Youtube.com user that
infringes its copyrights. And Viacom might believe that it does not have the
resources to find and issue notices for every video that is posted on Youtube.com
3
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States Supreme Court has ruled that “consistent” or “parallel” activity is
insufficient to state a claim: “Inferences and implications based on conduct alone,
however, are insufficient. Allegations describing conduct that could be merely
parallel to, or consistent with, conduct that would otherwise give rise to liability is
not sufficient to satisfy the plausibility standard.” (Doc. 60 at 11 (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–554 (2007).) Simply put, Ouellette
has failed to plead sufficient facts showing “that [he] is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
V.

Dismissal of Ouellette’s complaint
Finally, Ouellette objects to Judge Lynch’s recommendation to dismiss his

complaint with prejudice. Ouellette claims that he hopes to have the money to hire
a lawyer in the future to prosecute this case. Ouellette, however, has been given
ample opportunity to plead his claims under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
He has been on notice of the subjective good-faith standard since Judge Lynch’s
February 17, 2011 order. Because Ouellette has failed to adequately plead his §
512(f) misrepresentation claim, the Court agrees with Judge Lynch that “it is not
necessary to afford him yet another opportunity to amend.” (Doc. 60 at 14.)
IT IS ORDERED that Judge Lynch’s Findings and Recommendations (doc.
that infringes on its copyrights.
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60) is adopted in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Viacom International’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings (doc. 42) is GRANTED. Todd Ouellette’s Amended
Complaint (doc. 36) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court is
directed to enter by separate document a judgment of dismissal.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ouellette’s motions for summary judgment
(docs. 61–2; 61–3) are DENIED.
Dated this 25th day of April 2012.
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